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1. Introduction 
Scholarship no longer regards international criminal procedure as a collection of 
predominantly common law and civil law particles but has started viewing it as a sui generis 
system.
1
 This is not surprising. International criminal courts and tribunals have been 
developing procedures and practices that would enable them to deal with the complexities 
and extremities of prosecuting the notoriously fact-rich cases involving international crimes. 
At the same time, the tribunals have had to overcome the institutional handicaps of 
investigating crimes committed far away with little cooperation on the ground and without 
police forces of their own. These unique challenges, as well as the fact that the tribunals are 
composed of professionals from different domestic legal systems, could not but lead to the 
gradual consolidation of international criminal procedure as a distinctive system. 
Furthermore, an increasing amount of scholarly attention focuses on how these courts 
deal with the challenge of attaining reliable evidence.
2
 The jurisprudence from the 
International Criminal Court demonstrates that such attention is well warranted, as acquiring 
high-quality evidence has proved to be a major hurdle in practice. For instance, the 
unanimous judgment acquitting Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui was the consequence of evidentiary 
                                                          
* The author wishes to thank Sergey Vasiliev, and professors Elies van Sliedregt and Göran Sluiter for their 
helpful comments on earlier drafts. This Chapter also benefited from conversations with Professor Ellen Yee, 
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1
 J.D. Ohlin, ‘A Meta-Theory of International Criminal Procedure: Vindicating the Rule of Law’ (2009) 14 
UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 77, 81; R. Cryer et al., An Introduction to International 
Criminal Law and Procedure, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 429. See generally J.D. 
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2
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deficiencies in the form of the incredibility of all three key witnesses.
3
 In the Situation in 
Kenya, Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda filed a notification in early 2013 stating that her 
office was dropping the charges, which had been confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
against one of the accused, Francis Muthaura, due to the limited amount of witnesses willing 
and able to testify.
4
 Regarding another accused in the same situation, Kenya’s President 
Uhuru Kenyatta, Bensouda requested in December 2013 that the trial be postponed for three 
months, stating her office’s inability to proceed after one witness had asked to withdraw and 
another had admitted to lying.
5
 In the Laurent Gbagbo case, the Pre-Trial Chamber adjourned 
the hearing on the confirmation of charges, urging the prosecutor to provide further evidence 
in a decision containing a slap on the wrist for the OTP’s high reliance on reports of non-
governmental organizations and press articles, i.e. anonymous hearsay evidence.
6
 
 For domestic practitioners—the primary actors expected to investigate and prosecute 
international crimes both now and (even more so) in the future—it will be very useful to 
know what is typical for those crimes, and which problems are inherent to the efforts of 
constructing and proving these cases in court, regardless of the institutional framework 
employed for those purposes. Evidentiary difficulties as identified by scholarship and case 
law of the international criminal tribunals are not all forum-neutral, but it is reasonable to 
assume that some are. In dealing with this category of cases, domestic courts face certain 
evidentiary challenges, too, as shown by a recent Dutch case. In March 2013, the Dutch 
District Court in The Hague convicted Yvonne Basebya for incitement to commit genocide in 
Rwanda in 1994, but acquitted her of all other charges due to a lack of evidence. The decision 
emphasized that in establishing the facts in the case the court faced formidable evidentiary 
                                                          
3
 See Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG, TC II, ICC, 18 
December 2012, paras 124, 138-41, and 157-9 (witness P-250); paras 171-83, 189-90 (witness P-279); paras 
202, 204-7, 209, 211-3, 218-9 (witness P-280). 
4
 Prosecution notification of withdrawal of the charges against Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Muthaura and 
Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-687, TC V, ICC, 11 March 2013, paras 9-11. In relation to the ICC’s other Kenya 
case Ruto and Sang and witness-related issues see also ICC Press Release, ‘Ruto and Sang Case: ICC Trial 
Chamber V(a) states that interfering with witnesses is an offence against the administration of justice and may 
be prosecuted’, ICC-CPI-20130918-PR941, 18 September 2013, available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr941.aspx> (visited 30 September 
2013); Under seal ex parte, only available to the Prosecutor and the Registrar Warrant of arrest for Walter 
Osapiri Barasa, Barasa, ICC-01/09-01/13-1-Red2, PTC II, ICC, 2 August 2013 (unsealed 2 October 2013). 
5
 Notification of the removal of a witness from the Prosecution’s witness list and application for an adjournment 
of the provisional trial date, Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-875, TC V(B), ICC, 19 December 2013, paras 2-3.  
6
 Decision adjourning the hearing on the confirmation of charges pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome 
Statute, Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-432, PTC I, ICC, 3 June 2013 (‘Gbagbo adjournment decision’), paras 27-
35. 
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challenges, such as the time that had passed since the crimes took place and the 
precariousness of witnesses’ memories.7 
Despite the presence of forum-neutral evidentiary challenges in the investigation and 
prosecution of international crimes, the discourse has thus far been controlled by the 
conceptual divide between the international and national tiers of criminal adjudication. This 
Chapter suggests a change of methodological perspective. Focusing on the nature of the 
crime and keeping the domestic practitioner in mind, it raises the following interrelated 
questions. To what extent are the above-mentioned challenges inherent to the kind of court, 
i.e. forum-specific, and to what extent are they typical for the nature of international crimes? 
To be able to answer this twofold query we must first explain what makes international 
crimes different. If international crimes are indeed distinguishable from ‘regular’ domestic 
crimes, and the difficulties faced at the international level are not forum-specific but crime-
specific, then international criminal tribunals and domestic courts face similar evidentiary 
challenges. Solutions to these challenges developed by the international tribunals will also be 
a useful source of guidance for the investigative and prosecutorial endeavors at the national 
level. Such solutions may then be found in crime-focused analysis instead of through a sui 
generis approach to scrutinizing the law and practice of international criminal prosecutions. 
Although some of the evidentiary challenges in investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating 
international crimes are universal and not forum-specific, the nature of such crimes could 
arguably serve as a harmonizing factor for procedures and practices utilized in this category 
of cases across the board. The idiosyncrasies of international criminality may operate as a 
constraint on the growing pluralism between international and national criminal procedure, at 
least in the cases involving international crimes. 
In testing these ideas, this Chapter starts by discussing the idiosyncrasies of 
international crimes and the special challenges of investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating 
them, including the distinct goals typically associated with international criminal justice 
(section 2). It then continues by connecting these characteristics to the debate on evidentiary 
hurdles intrinsic to the investigation and prosecution of international crimes. Section 3 
examines how those hurdles affect evidentiary processes, regardless of the forum—national 
or international—in which the crimes are prosecuted. 
                                                          
7
 Basebya was acquitted of committing genocide as an intellectual perpetrator, abetting genocide, attempted 
genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, murder, and war crimes. See District Court The Hague, Judgment of 
1 March 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:BZ4292, unofficial English translation available at 
<http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:8710> (visited 13 October 2013) 
(‘Basebya judgment’). 
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2. The Nature of International Crimes: Differentiating Factors 
The distinction between ordinary and international crimes is not a black and white division. 
While the ICTY and ICTR allow prosecuting someone for international crimes when that 
person has already been convicted of committing the same acts defined as regular crimes at 
the national level,
8
 the ICC takes a more conduct-based approach. The PTC confirmed that 
the Rome Statute does not make the strict distinction between ordinary and international 
crimes. Article 20(3) allows for a successful ne bis in idem challenge whenever a person has 
been tried by another court for the same conduct as described in the crime definitions of the 
ICC Statute.
9
 Hence, the legal characterization of conduct as ‘ordinary’ or ‘international’ is of 
less importance within the ICC’s framework. Nevertheless, certain conduct, i.e. a 
conglomeration of facts, can be legally characterized as an international crime, while other 
conduct, for instance a single murder in no discernible context, cannot. Moreover, by 
labelling something as an international crime, certain objectives (history-telling, fighting 
impunity, and restoring international peace and security, all further discussed below) enter 
the playing field. Therefore, for the purpose of this Chapter, the phrase ‘international crime’ 
will be used to denote a distinctive type of crime, although the conduct definable as such can 
also be prosecuted as an ordinary crime at the national level.  
 This section will attempt to capture the special nature of international crimes by 
considering the three factors differentiating them from ordinary criminality: (i) the goals and 
functions of international criminal justice and international criminal trials (why an 
international crime needs to be adjudicated upon?); (ii) elements of the legal definitions: the 
ingredients and circumstances that comprise an international crime (what needs to be 
proven?); and (iii) the practical challenges of finding reliable evidence while managing the 
sheer volume of facts and the magnitude of the case (how is an international crime proven?).  
 
                                                          
8
 Art. 10(2) ICTY Statute and Art. 9(2) ICTR Statute. 
9
 Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Al-Islam Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, 
ICC-01/11-01/11-344-Red, PTC I, ICC, 31 May 2013, para. 86. 
Forthcoming in Pluralism in International Criminal Law, Elies van Sliedregt and Sergey Vasiliev, eds (OUP 2014) 
 
 5 
2.1 Goals of international criminal justice 
Traditional goals of domestic criminal law usually include retribution for wrongdoing, 
general and individual deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
10
 These naturally also 
play a role in relation to international crimes. Holding individual perpetrators accountable for 
crimes is generally thought to be the first and foremost objective that (international) criminal 
courts and tribunals pursue.
11
 But international criminal justice is often said to have certain 
broader goals that go beyond the traditional confines of the regular domestic criminal trial.
12
 
Trials dealing with mass atrocities such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide serve greater purposes determinative of the future of the societies in which the 
international crimes were committed.
13
 These goals include restoring international peace and 
security, fighting impunity, providing justice or ‘closure’ for victims, and recording history,14 
or in other words ‘the objective of “educating” people of “historical truths” through law.’15   
 The self-imposed goals of international criminal justice are plentiful, and scholars 
have raised questions as to whether international criminal institutions have enough strength to 
carry the weight of all of them.
16
 At the same time, it may prove impossible to determine in 
any empirical sense how the objectives specific for international criminal justice play a role 
in the daily realities of international criminal courts and tribunals.
17
 Still, it is possible to 
theorize about the potential influence of those special goals on evidentiary issues. 
 
A. Fighting impunity 
Ending impunity for international crimes by punishing the perpetrators is perhaps the most 
obvious objective of international criminal justice.
18
 But this goal is only partially inherent to 
the nature of international crimes. As a slogan, ‘fighting impunity’ was launched at the 
                                                          
10
 M. Damaška, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ (2008) 83 Chicago-Kent Law Review 329, 
331; B. Swart, ‘Damaška and the Faces of International Criminal Justice’ (2008) 6 JICJ 87, 100. 
11
 Swart (n 10) 100. 
12
 Cryer et al. (n 1) 30; Damaška (n 10) 331.  
13
 Cryer et al. (n 1) 30. 
14
 Ibid., 30-5; J. Jackson, ‘Faces of Transnational Justice: Two Attempts to Build Common Standards Beyond 
National Boundaries’ in J. Jackson et al. (eds), Crime, Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and 
International Context: Essays in Honour of Professor Mirjan Damaška (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) 226. 
See also Report of the UN Secretary-General, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
conflict Societies’, UN Doc. S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, para. 38. 
15
 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials’ (2002) 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 
Law 1, 34. 
16
 Damaška (n 10) 331; Ohlin (n 1) 84. 
17
 Swart (n 10) 107. 
18
 J.D. Ohlin, ‘Goals of International Criminal Justice and International Criminal Procedure’ in G. Sluiter et al. 
(eds), International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 59. 
Forthcoming in Pluralism in International Criminal Law, Elies van Sliedregt and Sergey Vasiliev, eds (OUP 2014) 
 
 6 
international level and can be found, among others, in the preamble of the ICC Statute. But as 
a notion it also closely resembles a more traditional objective of criminal law, namely 
retribution for wrongdoing. Fighting impunity may therefore be viewed as an objective of 
international criminal justice seen as a whole and is typical for international criminal law in 
that sense. However, as a criminal trial’s function, it is not necessarily typical for the 
prosecution and adjudication of international crimes, because the rationale behind punishing 
perpetrators in an individual case can be any of the traditional objectives of criminal law 
enforcement, i.e. retribution, general and individual deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation.
19
  
Even though fighting impunity is only a general goal of international criminal justice, 
and not by definition a separate objective of individual trials dealing with international 
crimes, it still harbors the potential of affecting evidentiary issues in specific cases. Xabier 
Agirre Aranburu points out, for instance, that the ‘[i]nvestigation of international crimes is 
often affected by a certain tendency to downgrade the presumption of innocence of the 
accused due to the extreme gravity of the crime and the high expectations created by the 
proceedings.’20 Considering the gravity and moral reprehensibility of international crimes in 
combination with the general objective of fighting impunity in an atmosphere of public 
outcry, the dangerous temptation to lower the standard of proof and demote the presumption 
of innocence may surface.
21
 From a normative perspective, it is unacceptable for the 
objective ‘fighting impunity’ to have the effect of lowering evidentiary standards, as such 
standards are indispensible for accurate fact-finding and the protection of the rights of the 
accused. From a practical perspective, at least some awareness of the ‘inquisitorial 
temptation’ is therefore of vital importance. 
 
                                                          
19
 Ibid. 
20
 X. Agirre Aranburu, ‘Methodology for the Criminal Investigation of International Crimes’ in A. Smeulers 
(ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Antwerpen: 
Intersentia, 2010) 358. Agirre Aranburu lists a number of ways in which the ‘inquisitorial temptation’ may 
surface in international criminal investigations, for instance: (1) in situations that are politically charged, 
‘[c]hoosing the subject matter by opportunistic criteria rather by the objective gravity and legal requirements 
may mislead the investigation and turn it into a plain fraud of law’; (2) suspect-driven as opposed to offence-
driven investigations, which ‘tends to develop a “target-oriented” inertia, a deliberate or unconscious 
assumption that the suspicion must be corroborated, rather than tested objectively’; and (3) an increased 
emphasis on the suffering of victims combined with a decreased emphasis on the role of the suspect. 
21
 Ibid. 356, 358-59. 
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B. Restoring international peace and security 
Restoring international peace and security as objective of international criminal justice is 
often mentioned as typical feature of international crimes prosecutions. But it only plays an 
explicit role with respect to a limited number of international criminal tribunals, namely the 
ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the permanent ICC.
22
 The first 
two international criminal tribunals were established by the UN Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which authorizes the UNSC to make binding law if 
there is a breach of, or threat to, international peace and security.
23
 With respect to the ICC, 
the UNSC may refer situations to the Court acting under the same chapter, triggering the 
ICC’s jurisdiction.24 The situations in Darfur (Sudan) and Libya were brought within the 
jurisdictional scope of the Court this way.
25
 
 Maintaining and restoring international peace and security in the sense of the UN 
Charter is a goal of international criminal justice at the macro (institutional) level, because 
the UNSC as the guardian of international peace and security is also the sponsor of the 
tribunals’ mandates and the trigger of their jurisdiction. However, whether restoring peace 
and security in general is typical for international crimes to the extent it can be viewed as a 
differentiating factor at the micro level (of individual trials and related evidentiary issues) is 
far from obvious. Prosecutions of ordinary domestic crimes are usually not deemed to pursue 
the goal of restoring peace and security in the (national) criminal justice discourse. However, 
if left unprosecuted, particularly in high-profile cases and on a wide scale, ordinary crimes 
are bound to disrupt social peace and public order in a given country. Hence, it is possible to 
argue that regular prosecutions in fact aim to protect the law and order on the national scale, 
in the sense comparable to the tribunals’ supposed contribution to the maintenance of 
international peace. If so, restoring international peace and security is not a unique 
characteristic inherent in the nature of international crimes. In any event, the goal is too far 
removed from the context of an actual trial, and does not directly affect evidentiary 
processes. 
 
                                                          
22
 See generally L. Reydams and J. Wouters, ‘The Politics of Establishing International Criminal Tribunals’ in 
L. Reydams, J. Wouters, and C. Ryngaert (eds), International Prosecutors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012) 6-80. 
23
 Chapter VII of the UN Charter permits the UNSC to ‘determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ and take military and non-military action to ‘restore international 
peace and security.’ This includes, for instance, the use of force or the launching of peacekeeping operations. 
24
 Art. 13(b) ICC Statute. 
25
 UNSC Res. 1593(2005), 31 March 2005 and UNSC Res. 1970(2011), 26 February 2011. 
Forthcoming in Pluralism in International Criminal Law, Elies van Sliedregt and Sergey Vasiliev, eds (OUP 2014) 
 
 8 
C. Preserving the historical record for didactic purposes 
As philosopher Santayana famously stated, those who do not remember the past are 
condemned to repeat it.
26
 Within the legal context, a similar chain of thought is often 
followed in the sense that ‘the best way to prevent recurrence of genocide, and other forms of 
state-sponsored mass brutality, is to cultivate a shared and enduring memory of its horrors – 
and to employ the law self-consciously towards this end.’27 In his opening statement at the 
beginning of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 1961, Attorney-General Gideon Hausner 
seemed less confident about the trial’s role in this larger scheme: ‘I doubt whether in this trial 
we … will succeed in laying bare the roots of the evil. This task must remain the concern of 
historians, sociologists, authors and psychologists, who will try to explain to the world what 
happened to it.’28 In any event, history-telling is generally regarded as the most idiosyncratic 
objective of prosecuting international crimes.
29
 
The idea that we can learn from the past leads to the assumption that recording history 
in criminal trials for the purpose of strengthening collective memory is a form of didacticism. 
There is thus a connection between the goal of history-telling on the one hand, and the 
broader didactic aims of reinforcing collective memory, learning from the past, and 
propagating human rights principles on the other hand. For the purpose of this Chapter, they 
can be discussed jointly for the reason that they are likely to similarly affect the amount of 
information considered at trial. In order to explore whether and how these supposed 
objectives of international criminal justice affect evidentiary processes, it is useful to give an 
overview the debate on the history-telling purpose of trials. This may expose possible 
influences and tensions between that purpose and the evidentiary aspects. 
 Is history-telling to remain the concern of historians alone? Lawyers generally state 
that the primary goal of a criminal trial is to establish the truth in relation to the charges 
brought against the accused. But many international criminal courts and tribunals have issued 
lengthy judgments in which they also provide detailed accounts of the background of 
                                                          
26
 G. Santayana, The Life of Reason; or the Phases of Human Progress. Vol. 1: Reason in Common Sense (New 
York: Dover Publications, 1980) 284. 
27
 M. Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997) 6. 
28
 Opening statement of Attorney-General Gideon Hausner, Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, Criminal Case 40/61, 
District Court of Jerusalem, available at <http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-
adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Session-006-007-008-01.html> (last visited 28 October 2013). 
29
 Swart (n 10) 107. 
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conflicts that led to the crimes.
30
 However, the goal of recording history in international 
criminal trials, or the idea that the ‘process of subjecting evidence to forensic scrutiny will set 
down a permanent record of the crimes that will stand the test of time,’31 has not gone 
without criticism. 
 There are roughly three schools of thought on the didactic goal of trials in cases 
involving international crimes. The first school of thought perceives the broader goal of 
history-telling as a legitimate (or even primary) objective of an international criminal trial. 
This is known as didactic legality or didactic history.
32
 The proponents of ‘didactic legality’, 
such as Lawrence Douglas and Mark Osiel, argue that there is room for undertaking 
education through history-telling in trials involving international crimes without undermining 
the legitimacy of the process. Douglas concedes that a criminal trial has the primary purpose 
of answering the guilt/innocence question, but he continues that it is not a trial’s sole 
purpose: extralegal interests of collective instruction are amongst its valid functions.
33
 Osiel 
emphasizes the importance of story-telling within the legal context for the creation of 
collective memory.
34
 
 The second school, known as liberal legalism, advocates the idea that a criminal trial 
should serve only one purpose, and that is to determine the guilt or innocence of the 
accused.
35
 One of this school of thought’s more famous, and perhaps one of its first advocates 
is Hannah Arendt. In her well-known book, she states that ‘[t]he purpose of a trial is to render 
justice, and nothing else. Even the noblest of ulterior purposes … can only detract from the 
law’s main business: to weigh the charges brought against the accused, to render judgment, 
and to mete out due punishment.’36 Even though Attorney-General Hausner was aware of the 
difficulties of exposing the ‘roots of the evil’, during the Eichmann trial he still maintained 
that history was at the center of the proceedings: ‘[i]t is not an individual that is in the dock at 
this historic trial, and not the Nazi regime alone, but anti-Semitism throughout history’. 
                                                          
30
 See e.g. Judgement, Tadić, IT-94-1-T, TC II, ICTY, 7 May 1997, paras 53-192; Judgement, Akayesu, ICTR-
96-4-T, TC I, ICTR, 2 September 1998, paras 78-111; Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Lubanga, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, TC I, ICC, 14 March 2012, paras 67-91. 
31
 Cryer et al. (n 1) 31. 
32
 See e.g. L. Douglas, The Memory of Judgment; Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); Osiel (n 27). See also R.A. Wilson, Writing History in International 
Criminal Trials (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 16. 
33
 Douglas (n 32) 2. 
34
 Osiel (n 27) 2. 
35
 Wilson (n 32) 2-3; Douglas (n 32) 2. 
36
 H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, rev. edn (New York: Penguin Group, 
2006) 253. 
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Arendt objected to this notion concluding that ‘[i]t was bad history and cheap rhetoric’,37 and 
observing that the didactic purpose pursued in the Eichmann trial led to breaches of due 
process rights.
38
 Legal liberalism asserts that the sole function of a criminal trial is to 
determine whether the alleged crimes occurred and whether the accused can be held 
criminally responsible for them. When a court attempts to answer broader questions, such as 
why the underlying conflict occurred, or tries to resolve a clash of competing historical 
interpretations, it undermines due process, which ultimately damages the credibility of the 
legal system as a whole.  
 Douglas nuances the assertion stated by legal liberalists that setting history-telling as 
a goal in a criminal trial will automatically violate the rights of the accused. As he puts it, 
‘[t]o succeed as a didactic spectacle in a democracy, a trial must be justly conducted insofar 
as one of the principal pedagogic aims of such a proceeding must be to make visible and 
public the sober authority of the rule of law.’39 In other words, these trials must be fair or else 
they would not be successful in getting the lessons they are meant to convey across to the 
general public. A blatantly unfair trial is not a convincing teacher. Douglas also notes that 
some legal liberalists express a related view, namely that it is not so much inappropriate for 
courts to try to write history, nor will the rights of the accused necessarily be violated if they 
pursue the history-writing objective; however, courts will inevitably fail in any attempt to do 
so.
40
 Judges may not have the capacity to produce a nuanced picture of events, since they 
function under time constraints and are bound by considerations of legal relevancy.
41
 From 
the perspective of the historian, judge-painted historical pictures will seem ‘fragmentary, 
foreshortened, and locked in an arbitrary time frame’.42 Osiel notes this stance, too, and 
observes that ‘[t]he prevailing opinion is now that the attempt to combine the two endeavors 
is very likely to produce poor justice or poor history, probably both.’43 
The judges in the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem were cognizant of their shortcomings as 
historians. They articulated the third school of thought, which is closely related to the second 
school of thought but milder in its articulation: the by-product doctrine. In their judgment 
they wrote: ‘[a]s for questions of principle which are outside the realm of law, no one has 
                                                          
37
 Ibid., 19. 
38
 Ibid., 221. See also Wilson (n 32) 4. 
39
 Douglas (n 32) 3; cf. Ohlin (n 1) 93 n75.  
40
 Douglas (n 32) 3. See also Wilson (n 32) 6. 
41
 Damaška (n 10) 336. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Osiel (n 27) 80. 
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made us judges of them, and therefore no greater weight is to be attached to our opinion on 
them than to that of any person devoting study and thought to these questions. … Without a 
doubt, the testimony given at this trial by survivors of the Holocaust, who poured out their 
hearts as they stood in the witness box, will provide valuable material for research workers 
and historians, but as far as this Court is concerned, they are to be regarded as by-products of 
the trial.’44 These three schools of thought focus on the question whether courts should 
promote the didactic history-telling objective. On a more practical note, though, regardless of 
whether they ought to, can they? Wilson conducted empirical research on how practitioners 
understand the combination of history and law in courtrooms.
45
 He does not unequivocally 
subscribe to any of the schools of thought discussed above. On the one hand, he does not 
advocate a greater role than currently exists for history and historians in international 
criminal trials – international criminal courts and tribunals should not be overloaded with too 
many diverging functions. On the other hand, Wilson believes that these courts are indeed 
capable of leaving valuable historical narratives behind.
46
 His research shows that 
practitioners often insist that the goal of history-telling is not a burden that should be placed 
on the shoulders of judicial institutions.
47
 Providing historical truth, or historical narratives, is 
merely a by-product of international crimes proceedings. At times, judges have insisted that 
the portions of their judgments concerning history should be interpreted as background 
information and contextual material, not as proven facts.
48
 The by-product doctrine is 
therefore a form of legal liberalism that accepts the inevitable effect that criminal proceedings 
involving international crimes have on historical narratives. However, this third school of 
thought explicitly distances itself from the idea that it is a trial’s purpose. That does not mean 
that judicial institutions should not take this inevitable side-effect into consideration or that 
history as such does not play a role in the adjudication of international crimes. 
 Setting didactic history-telling as general objective of international criminal justice is 
rather harmless in the sense that it does not automatically lead to infringing the rights of the 
accused and it does not necessarily affect the scope of the trial. However, when this objective 
is set as a function at the trial level, or as a prosecution’s explicit objective, it may have a 
                                                          
44
 Judgment, Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, Criminal Case 40/61, District Court of Jerusalem, 11 December 1961, 
para. 2. 
45
 Wilson (n 32). 
46
 Ibid., 16, 18. 
47
 See generally ibid. See also W. Schabas, Unimaginable Atrocities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 
161. 
48
 Schabas (n 47) 162. 
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differentiating effect because the amount of information relevant to the case increases as does 
the amount of elements that need to be proven. 
 
2.2 What to prove 
The goal of didactic history-telling may influence the scope of the truth-finding process, but 
substantive criminal law norms govern it in the most direct sense, serving as restrictions on 
the search for the truth.
49
 Substantive elements, such as the factual allegations pertaining to 
the individual crimes charged, the contextual elements of the crimes, and the criminal 
responsibility of the accused, demarcate the scope of the case and comprise the material facts 
establishing the innocence or guilt of the accused. With respect to international crimes, there 
is a thin line, here. International crime definitions contain contextual elements that refer to 
the historical and political context. Courts prosecuting and adjudicating international crimes 
will inevitably focus on more than just the specific conduct charged, as is the case with 
conventional crimes.
50
 International crimes are crimes of context because their definitions 
contain ‘elements that operate as qualifiers of gravity and restrictors of international 
jurisdiction to extraordinarily offensive crimes.’51 
 The political and historical context being part of the definitions of international 
crimes is not their only typical and challenging aspect when it comes to substantive law. 
Another such aspect concerns the theories of individual criminal liability and, more 
specifically, the ways of linking intellectual perpetrators to the atrocities committed on the 
ground. This challenge arises not only in relation to the didactic goal of history-telling, but 
also in relation to the pragmatic task of attributing crimes to the leadership. Since prosecution 
of international crimes is aimed at the most responsible and usually the furthest removed 
perpetrators, linkage problems inevitably arise regardless of any additional goals pursued. 
Broader goals of international crime prosecutions, context in which the crimes take place, and 
individual culpability are aspects of international criminal law that should not be seen as 
isolated notions. This section will address the connections between them in greater detail.  
 
                                                          
49
 M. Damaška, ‘Truth in Adjudication’ (1998) 49 Hastings Law Journal 289, 293. 
50
 Damaška (n 10) 337. 
51
 Agirre Aranburu (n 20) 367. 
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A. Crimes of context 
The adjudication of international crimes is more likely than conventional criminal 
prosecutions to involve evidence relating to the context, because the historical and political 
context in which such crimes take place is relevant for proving them. Consider, for instance, 
that the political and historical context in which a domestic crime such as a single murder (or 
even multiple murders by a serial killer) takes place generally does not matter for 
understanding or proving the crime in court.
52
 
 In relation to an international crime, there are three key ways in which context plays a 
role. First, it can in fact be part of the crime definition, and consequently, subject of the truth-
finding endeavor. For example, war crimes are classified as such only where certain acts take 
place within the context of an (international or internal) armed conflict.
53
 Crimes against 
humanity are defined as occurring as part of a widespread of systematic attack against a 
civilian population.
54
 As to genocide, it is not clear-cut whether contextual elements are part 
of the crime definition. The ICC Elements of Crimes add to all the different acts which may 
constitute genocide (killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting 
conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, and imposing measures 
intended to prevent births) that ‘[t]he conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern 
of similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such 
destruction.’55 Usage of the word ‘or’ leaves both options open. Conversely, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber in Jelisić held that ‘the existence of a plan or policy is not a legal 
ingredient’ of the crime of genocide, i.e. that the context is not a mandatory element, but may 
play a role in proving the crime.
56
 Antonio Cassese formulated the middle-ground position: ‘a 
contextual element is not required … for some instances of genocide, whilst it is needed for 
other categories.’57 
The second way in which context plays a role in international crimes prosecution has 
been mentioned above with reference to the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s holding in Jelisić. 
                                                          
52
 Koskenniemi (n 15) 12. 
53
 Arts 2 and 3 ICTY Statute; Art. 4 ICTR Statute; Art. 8 ICC Statute. 
54
 Art. 5 ICTY Statute; Art. 3 ICTR Statute; Art. 7 ICC Statute. The ICC Statute adds an element, namely that a 
crime against humanity is a crime committed in furtherance of a state or organizational policy. 
55
 Arts 6(a)(4), 6(b)(4), 6(c)(4), and 6(d)(4) ICC Elements of Crimes (emphasis added). 
56
 See Judgement, Jelisić, IT-95-10-A, AC, ICTY, 5 July 2001, para. 48 (‘the existence of a plan or policy is not 
a legal ingredient of the crime. However, in the context of proving specific intent, the existence of a plan or 
policy may become an important factor in most cases. The evidence may be consistent with the existence of a 
plan or policy, or may even show such existence, and the existence of a plan or policy may facilitate proof of the 
crime.’). 
57
 A. Cassese, ‘Genocide’ in A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 335. 
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Context can be used for proving certain elements of crimes, such as the existence of a plan or 
policy to commit genocide may be relied upon for establishing the mandatory elements of 
that crime. This does not mean that the context forms a part of the substantive merits of the 
case or in itself amounts to such an element. The ICC uses context in a similar manner. For 
instance, in the decision adjourning the hearing on the confirmation of charges in the case 
against Laurent Gbagbo, the PTC held that when the prosecutor identifies particular incidents 
that constitute the attack against the civilian population (in relation to crimes against 
humanity), ‘the incidents are “facts” which “support the [contextual] legal elements of the 
crime charged”.’58 The individual incidents are not contextual elements of the crime against 
humanity; the attack, however, is such an element. 
The third way in which context is relevant is when facts are used for the construction 
of a narrative or as background information. For example, the Dutch court used context 
implicitly in the Basebya case.
59
 Jurisprudence from the ICC, however, makes explicit that a 
narrative shedding light on the prosecution’s theory of the case is an important aspect of 
presenting evidence at the confirmation stage of the proceedings. At that stage, the 
prosecution must demonstrate ‘a clear line of reasoning underpinning [the] specific 
allegations’.60 It is to do so by presenting certain contextual facts (often referred to as 
‘subsidiary facts’).61 Such facts are only to be considered ‘as background information or as 
indirect proof of the material facts’.62 This is slightly odd. How can (alleged) facts be 
considered indirect proof of material facts? ICC jurisprudence, however, does not equate 
subsidiary facts with circumstantial evidence, despite the similarities between the notions 
circumstantial evidence and indirect proof. Rather, ‘[t]he [material] “facts and 
circumstances” underlying charges are to be distinguished from other factual allegations 
which may be contained in a DCC [Document Containing the Charges] as a whole. These 
                                                          
58
 Gbagbo adjournment decision (n 6), para. 21. 
59
 See e.g. Basebya judgment (n 7) at 4.18, 4.34, 5.1. 
60
 See e.g. Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-803, PTC I, ICC, 29 January 
2007, para. 39; Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-243, PTC I, ICC, 8 
February 2010, para. 37; Corrigendum of the “Decision on the Confirmation of Charges”, Banda and Jerbo, 
ICC-02/05-03/09-121-Corr-Red, PTC I, ICC, 7 March 2011 (‘Banda and Jerbo confirmation of charges 
decision’), para. 37; Decision on the confirmation of charges, Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-465, PTC I, 
ICC, 16 December 2011, para. 40.  
61
 Banda and Jerbo confirmation of charges decision (n 60) paras 36, 39; Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, Muthaura et al., ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, 
PTC II, ICC, 23 January 2012, paras 59-60, 158-9; see also Dissenting Opinion of Judge Silvia Fernandez de 
Gurmendi, Gbagbo adjournment decision (n 6), para. 34 n39. 
62
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other allegations may provide general background information or indicate intermediate steps 
in the prosecution's chain of reasoning.’63 
This Chapter, dealing with the characteristics of the crime as such, focuses primarily 
on the first type of use of context, i.e. when it is indeed part of the crime definition. From the 
perspective of the court’s reach, the contextual elements in the definitions of international 
crimes narrow the scope of material jurisdiction. Only conduct that took place within a 
specific context may be characterized as an international crime. However, compared to 
domestic crimes, contextual elements in international crime definitions widen a trial’s scope 
as they increase the number of crime ingredients that need to be proven, and consequently, 
the amount of direct and indirect evidence that will be presented. The contextual elements 
also pose additional evidentiary challenges. Next to certain other peculiar requirements of 
international crime definitions, e.g. the special intent for the crime of genocide, such elements 
are in fact most difficult to establish.
64
 They therefore enhance the complexity and magnitude 
of the process of gathering and presenting evidence. 
 
B. Modes of liability 
A typical characteristic of international crimes prosecutions is the distinction between crime 
base evidence and linkage evidence.
65
 In a conventional criminal case, the starting point for 
police investigators is the occurrence of a crime, after which a suspect will be sought. But in 
international crime cases, courts and tribunals, whether national or international, are often 
faced with a reversal of this sequence. Certain suspects will have already been identified, 
                                                          
63
 Order regarding the content of the charges, Muthaura and Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-536, TC V, ICC, 20 
November 2012, para. 13. Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi observed that ‘facts of a subsidiary nature will 
usually emerge from “circumstantial evidence”’. See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Silvia Fernandez de 
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Chamber I of 14 July 2009 entitled “Decision giving notice to the parties and participants that the legal 
characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of 
the Court”, Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2205, AC, ICC, 8 December 2009, para. 90 n163; Judgment on the 
appeal of Mr Germain Katanga against the decision of Trial Chamber II of 21 November 2012 entitled 
“Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing the charges 
against the accused persons”, Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3363, AC, ICC, 27 March 2013, para. 50; Judgment 
on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 3 June 2013 entitled “Decision 
adjourning the hearing on the confirmation of charges pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute”, 
Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-572, AC, ICC, 16 December 2013, para. 37. 
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 Agirre Aranburu (n 20) 367. 
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after which the individual crimes and the suspects’ connection to them will be investigated. 
The identified suspect is linked to the crime, the occurrence of which is known through open 
source materials such as NGO reports, news articles, and social media, instead of identifying 
the suspect based on his or her putative link to the crime. 
 Linking the crime(s) to the alleged perpetrator remains one of the biggest challenges 
in international criminal justice. Yet, linkage evidence is more determinative for the decision 
on individual criminal responsibility and for the outcome of the case than crime base 
evidence, which may be less disputed at trial.
66
 Since prosecutions focus on the most 
responsible perpetrators that are generally far removed from the actual crime scene, 
investigators and prosecutors dedicate a considerable amount of their effort to unearthing 
linkage evidence. Moreover, these perpetrators are not only far removed, but they also hardly 
ever act alone. With the political and historical context being an element of international 
crime definitions, individualization inevitably comes under a certain amount of pressure. 
Koskenniemi goes even further, stating that ‘in the end, individualisation is … impossible’.67 
There is always the danger that establishing the connection between the accused and the 
crime would be drawn through ‘broad interpretations and assumptions about the political and 
administrative culture.’68  
 In order to translate the complex realities into legal qualifications, theories of liability, 
such as Joint Criminal Enterprise, (indirect) co-perpetration, superior and command 
responsibility, and aiding and abetting as a form of complicity in crime, have been 
developing at the international criminal courts and tribunals. It is beyond the scope of this 
Chapter to attempt to contribute to the fascinating debates on these theories.
69
 Clearly, 
linkage issues and related theories of attribution are central to dealing with international 
crimes, but just as the contextual elements in crime definitions, they do not necessarily affect 
evidentiary rules or principles directly. However, the position of the accused vis-à-vis the 
crime(s) raises the same practical question as with contextual elements, namely: how are 
international crimes to be proven? This third differentiating factor, discussed below, lies at 
the heart of the dialectic relationship between substantive and procedural law. 
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2.3 How to Prove 
As Damaška pointed out, in the previous century we have ‘witnessed not only the growing 
uncertainty about the concept of objective truth, but also the realization of the fallibility of 
our fact-finding methods, particularly when human behavior is the object of investigation.’70 
In the international criminal justice discourse, a similar observation may be made. In addition 
to the legal linkage problems discussed above, factually linking the (intellectual) perpetrator 
to the atrocity is often difficult when prosecuting and adjudicating international crimes. As 
noted, international crimes prosecutions target the most responsible perpetrators higher-up in 
the political and military structures that are not always well-defined and meticulously 
documented
71
 and people that are usually most removed from the scene of the crime. 
Therefore, ‘assigning individual liability may turn out to be a laborious and intricate task, 
requiring the use of a variety of sources and long hours of painstaking analysis.’72  
Moreover, there are certain typical fact-finding impediments that afflict the processes 
of investigation and prosecution of international crimes. These include cultural differences 
between witnesses and criminal justice professionals, language issues and translation errors, 
and unreliability of witnesses.
73
 Not all of these are necessarily caused by the nature of the 
crime. For instance, language and cultural differences pose no comparable difficulties when 
an international crime is prosecuted in the country where the atrocities took place.
74
 
However, there are several issues concerning witnesses that are a re-occurring theme when 
dealing with international crimes. 
First, the ICC acquittal of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui in the Situation in the DRC, the 
dropping of charges against Muthaura as well as the request for postponement in the 
Kenyatta case in the Situation in Kenya show how difficult it is to find (and hold on to) 
reliable witnesses, and how the lack thereof may make the prosecution lose its case. Save for 
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exceptional situations such as in Nuremberg, a considerable reliance on witness testimony is 
inevitable when prosecuting international crimes.
75
 This presents investigators and 
prosecutors with a number of problems. Kenneth Mann points to such problems with 
evidence in the Demjanjuk trial in Israel: ‘the testimony came from witnesses whose 
memories were created in extremely traumatic settings, based on events that had occurred 
many years earlier.’76 The Hague District Court in the Yvonne Basebya case also devoted a 
considerable portion of its judgment to analyzing the reliability of witness statements. It 
observed that they are ‘based on the memory of the witnesses’ and that ‘[a]lthough most 
memories of sincere witnesses are reliable, memories are never a complete and accurate 
rendition of reality. Human perceptivity is limited, matters are forgotten and mistakes may be 
made when remembering things.’77 The court acknowledged that assessing credibility and 
reliability of witnesses was a difficult task since the alleged crimes during the Rwandan 
genocide took place over 20 years ago. Time lapse calls for great prudence, and ‘[t]his 
cautiousness is all the more relevant since this case concerns events in … a country which 
was torn by deep political and ethnic differences and an armed conflict as a result of all 
this.’78 Criminal courts dealing with old core crimes cases will encounter these problems to a 
great extent, as has also been noted, for instance, with respect to the ECCC.
79
  
There is often some amount of delay when investigating and prosecuting international 
crimes. Whether it be a time lapse of 20, 30, 50, or only a few years, this can cause problems 
with finding and preserving evidence, and dealing with the fading memories of witnesses. 
But also newer cases will suffer from the problem that witnesses have been through an 
extremely traumatic experience, trauma being a factor diminishing the factual accuracy of 
witness recollections, and will have told their stories on several previous occasions, for 
instance to journalists, NGO workers, and members of UN commissions of inquiry. One can 
think of domestic cases where the level of traumatization is similarly grave, such as sexual 
crimes cases, but in those instances it is unlikely that the victim witness will have told their 
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story repeatedly to other (non-judicial) fact-finders. The ICC, conversely, does encounter this 
problem, as nowadays journalists and human rights researchers are generally at the crime 
scene before the Court starts its investigation, and these non-judicial fact-finders will have 
talked to potential witnesses before the Court’s investigators get the opportunity to do so.80  
 
3. Quantity Affects Quality 
As already briefly stipulated in the previous sections, some objectives of international 
criminal justice, the typical features of international crimes, and doctrines of individual 
criminal responsibility lead to an increase in the amount of information relevant for a specific 
case. But compared to the meticulous documentation kept by the Nazi regime, modern-day 
war criminals generally do not leave a paper trail usable in criminal prosecutions.
81
 The 
significant role played by witnesses is typical for the prosecutions of international crimes as 
there are usually not enough written records or forensic evidence to serve as linkage 
evidence. However, the complexity of the crime and the physical distance of the alleged 
perpetrator from the offence make such evidence crucial – in fact, most evidence in core 
crimes cases is linkage evidence.
82
 Considering the issues surrounding reliability of witness 
recollections regarding events that happened a long time ago, an increase in quantity of proof 
may be the response of parties in practice to the lack of quality of individual pieces of 
evidence. Such additional evidence may be more witness testimony or other types of 
evidence in corroboration. At the international criminal tribunals this is not a solution in the 
normative sense though. These institutions’ evidentiary regimes rest on the principle of free 
assessment of proof not requiring a multiplicity of pieces of evidence; the presentation of 
excessive and repetitive witness evidence may be discouraged in light of the manageability of 
the trial. But in practice, the gathering and usage of multiple sources is an understandable 
tactic employed by the parties when trying to prove a fact. 
Given the poor quality of the available evidence, the increase in the amount of 
information and evidence that potentially comes under consideration by the court is 
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inevitable. Scale and quantity are more than bare numbers, as in quantity itself lie problems. 
This section draws a link between the features of international crimes discussed above and 
evidentiary challenges. It does so by examining the following hypothesis: the quantity of 
information affects the quality of evidence, and eventually, could affect the law governing the 
admission and presentation of evidence. Measures that are designed to reduce the quantity of 
evidence in international crimes cases, in particular taking judicial notice of adjudicated facts 
and facts of common knowledge, will therefore be discussed.  
 
3.1 On scope and quantity 
As noted previously, the didactic purpose of history-telling may entail a significant increase 
in the amount of information considered legally relevant to a particular case. Didactic 
legalism is likely to welcome the expansion of the scope of (supposedly) relevant evidence as 
it allows for the educational value of the trial to take center stage. However, this also means 
that the larger historical context, including parts of it that are outside the scope of the acts of 
the accused or the strict crime definition, becomes the subject of truth-finding at trial. This 
can be problematic on two levels. First, when a criminal trial concerns larger historical and 
political events, it will necessarily involve an interpretation of that context. The interpretation 
of the context is exactly the thing that is disputed in relation to the individual acts of the 
accused, which is the subject of the trial.
83
 Consider, however, the following example 
articulated by Koskenniemi: Milošević, not Western leaders, was on trial, which presumes 
the correctness, from the ICTY’s perspective, of the Western view of the political and 
historical context of the Yugoslav wars. However, the accused understandably contested this 
view, and therefore contested the context. If the Tribunal’s view of the historical context had 
remained uncontested, it may have increased the trial’s educational value, but the position of 
the prosecutor would have been automatically vindicated, potentially turning it into a show 
trial.
84
 To refer to contemporary international criminal trials as show trials is controversial, 
but Koskenniemi rightly points out a potentially treacherous paradox that is created here. He 
explains that  
 
to convey an unambiguous historical “truth” to its audience, the trial will have to silence the 
accused. But in such case, it ends up as a show trial. In order for the trial to be legitimate, the 
accused must be entitled to speak. But in that case, he will be able to challenge the version of 
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truth represented by the prosecutor and relativize the guilt that is thrust upon him by the 
powers on whose strength the Tribunal stands.
85
 
 
 The second problem with allowing more contextual information into evidence is that 
it diametrically opposes international criminal law’s most basic foundation as it was 
articulated in the Nuremberg judgment: international crimes are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities.
86
 The concept of individual criminal responsibility constituted emancipation 
from collective responsibility, and more specifically, it meant breaking away from the theory 
of immunity of state officials.
87
 The so-called ‘fight against impunity’ is based on the belief 
that international crimes should be subjected to individual criminal responsibility, not (only) 
state responsibility. Admittedly, individualization has its limits in this respect: these crimes 
inevitably take place within a certain context or system, and therefore imply collective 
criminality.
88
 To borrow from Van Sliedregt: ‘[t]his type of “system-criminality” generates 
“system-responsibility” which, by bringing in collective elements, puts pressure on the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility.’89 International criminal law scholars and 
practitioners are engaged in a constant balancing act of collective elements and 
individualization.
90
 The question arises whether this area of tension can endure more 
pressure. As Damaška points out, ‘deeper background issues tend to dwarf the subject of 
individual culpability, and it becomes clear that it is best for judges to limit their inquiries 
into the larger context to the very minimum required by the definition of international 
crimes.’91 Including history-telling as a trial’s objective, and widening the trial’s substance 
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accounting for the collective nature of most international crimes.’ Ibid., 1217. 
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under scrutiny even further, may put additional pressure on the principle of individual 
criminal responsibility.  
 It can therefore be disputed whether setting additional objectives in international 
crimes cases is desirable at the micro (trial) level. Insofar as the context is part of the crime 
definition, an increase in the amount of evidence is unavoidable but perhaps only to that 
extent legitimate. Quantity may lead to quality on the one hand, but it can also lead to 
evidence debris and other unwanted side-effects on the other hand. For instance, quality may 
improve where the fact that requires proof is of a quantitative nature. When trying to 
demonstrate that an armed attack was in fact widespread, having a plurality of witnesses that 
can testify to incidents that help corroborate that element of a crime against humanity affects 
the strength of the case in a positive way. However, where quantity leads to so much 
evidence that it clogs up the system and creates unmanageable trials, the quality of the 
proceedings as a whole may be affected negatively. Scrutinizing large quantities of evidence 
becomes difficult and time-consuming for all parties involved and may create ambiguity as to 
the scope of the case, potentially infringing upon the accused’s right to be tried without 
undue delay and to be notified of the charged against him or her.   
 
3.2 Enhancing judicial economy 
When discussing the quantity of evidence and what needs to be proven, it is also important to 
note what does not need proof. Not all of the material facts need to be proven at the 
international criminal tribunals, and that may solve part of the quantity problem. Broader 
solutions such as judges’ managerial powers and negotiated justice aside, two evidentiary 
rules come to mind that are intended to stimulate judicial economy, and which allow a court 
to consider a fact established without requiring evidence to prove its existence: first, agreed 
facts, and second, judicial notice of facts of common knowledge and adjudicated facts.
92
 
 Parties may agree upon facts that then do not require formal proof. For instance, Rule 
65ter(H) of the ICTY RPE states that the pre-trial judge shall record the points of agreement 
and disagreement on matters of fact and law. The ICC RPE contains a similar provision in 
Rule 69 concerning the agreements on facts, which the Chamber may consider as having 
been proven unless the interest of justice required otherwise. Parties may agree upon any 
(type of) fact. The scope of agreed facts is therefore broad in theory, but because it depends 
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on the willingness of the parties to agree on them the amount of agreed facts is usually 
marginal in practice.
93
 
Judicial notice is a tool that allows a court to take certain facts as proven without 
hearing evidence. Rule 94 of the ICTY and ICTR RPE states that the court may take judicial 
notice of facts of common knowledge (or ‘notorious’ facts), adjudicated facts, and of the 
authenticity of documentary evidence (such as UN documentation).
94
 The rule originated in 
the common law, but can also be found in civil law systems.
95
 As Nina Jørgensen illustrates, 
the most telling example of the use of judicial notice of notorious facts is the decision of a 
United States Circuit Court to judicially notice the ‘traditional features of a snowman.’96 An 
example at the international level is when the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) took judicial notice of the occurrence of genocide in Rwanda in 1994 as a fact of 
common knowledge,
97
 something that was also followed by the Dutch court in Basebya.
98
 
The rationale behind rules of judicial notice is to speed up trials by not devoting time to 
proving issues that are blatantly obvious, and to enhance consistency in factual findings 
between various chambers.
99
  
At first glance, taking judicial notice of certain facts and recognizing agreed facts 
appear to save a substantial amount of time. However, these evidentiary rules also expose 
evidence law as an area of law that is a balancing act of various fair trial rights. For example, 
the right to be tried without undue delay may benefit from judicially noticing certain facts, 
but at the same time, judicially noticed facts should not form the decisive basis for a 
conviction, as that would violate the right of the accused to a fair trial. Regular evidentiary 
procedures of proving a fact in court allow the accused to exercise a number of rights, such as 
the rights to defend himself or to examine witnesses.
100
 While judicially noticed facts cannot 
be relied upon for establishing individual criminal liability directly, they may be used to do 
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so indirectly.
101
 It has been suggested that the matter should not be a balance between equally 
fundamental interests, but a protection of the fundamental right to a fair trial while improving 
judicial economy.
102
  
Furthermore, it can be disputed whether dispensing with the need for formal proof 
truly speeds up trials. While the Court is obliged to judicially notice facts of common 
knowledge, adjudicated facts or the authenticity of documentary evidence may be judicially 
noticed at the request of a party, after hearing the parties.
103
 This implies an obligation on the 
opposing party to dispute the accuracy of the suggested facts.
104
 Having to respond to long 
lists of facts offered for notice by the prosecution places a significant burden on the defence. 
As one ICTY Trial Chamber recognized, ‘since the admission of an adjudicated fact only 
creates a presumption as to its accuracy, the admission may consume considerable time and 
resources during the course of the proceedings, thereby frustrating, in practice, the 
implementation of the principle of judicial economy.’105 
While in theory a valuable tool for restricting the quantity of evidence, taking judicial 
notice of certain facts should not be overestimated as a practical solution. Unfortunately, the 
same can be said of agreed facts; in reality, parties are not likely to reach such agreements 
often. If these rules are to decrease evidence quantity in relation to international crimes across 
the international-national boundary, additional mechanisms need to be developed to remedy 
their practical shortcomings. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter shows that certain typical features of international crimes set these crimes apart 
from ordinary crimes. Such features lead to an exponential increase of information that must 
be considered and managed at all stages of investigation, prosecution, and adjudication. The 
amount of information can help prove the relevant fact where, due to subpar quality of 
individual pieces of evidence, it serves the purpose of corroboration (and not merely 
repetition). But quantity also leads to time- and information-management problems that 
should not be underestimated. This Chapter does not come up with new evidentiary rules 
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allowing to better deal with the tremendous amount of information relevant in the 
prosecutions of international crimes. Instead, it mainly illustrates the point that the search for 
procedural solutions that may prove effective in international crimes cases both at the 
international and national level should proceed from the systematic review of the unique 
characteristics of international crimes. Such review will also be indispensable for identifying 
the problems intrinsic in core crimes prosecutions and the extent to which the available 
solutions provide an adequate response to those problems. Hence, it could be useful for any 
investigation, prosecution and adjudication of international crimes, whether conducted by an 
international criminal tribunal, a hybrid court, or a domestic court. Essentially, the Chapter 
suggests a change of perspective on the law of evidence and advocates for a different 
methodology that focuses on the crime, not the court. 
All courts are likely to encounter the same evidentiary challenges if these are inherent 
to the type of crime. Forum-neutral solutions may be the answer. In addition to the horizontal 
harmonization of international criminal law and procedure at the international level that has 
led to much scholarship on the sui generis nature of these bodies of law, vertical 
harmonization across the national-international divide will occur if one assumes that the type 
of crime is in fact the binding, overarching factor. While national courts can learn from the 
best practices developed by international courts and tribunals, any harmonization in 
accordance with the type of crime, i.e. vertical harmonization, will also lead to collateral, 
horizontal pluralism within any given national system. In respect of justice for international 
crimes, pluralism and harmonization are in fact mutually inclusive phenomena. 
In any event, the effect of the typical features of international crimes on principles or 
rules of evidence should be left to a minimum, the pursuance of additional goals at the micro-
level is better avoided, and the temptation to downgrade the presumption of innocence should 
be resisted. Such tendencies would defy the purpose of international criminal justice as ‘[i]t 
would indeed be a disheartening irony if a justice system, designed to contribute to the 
protection of human rights, could properly function only by disregarding humanistic 
values’.106 This would lead to legal fictions and trials of preferred outcomes, in which case 
we would be getting as lost in our ideology of fighting impunity, as many of the perpetrators 
of international crimes got lost in theirs. 
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